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Abstract:  Mobile commerce is becoming more and more 
popular which makes it possible to purchase goods and 
services anywhere and anytime. However, traditional 
payment schemes do not suffice for our demand as more 
novel commercial services were provided. Therefore, it’s 
urgent to construct a safer and more convenient payment 
scheme for the forthcoming mobile era.  
A mobile payment scheme is proposed in the paper. The 
scheme called MPDTN provides an ideal mobile payment 
with dynamic transaction numbers. Through it, consumers 
can pay fares by using mobile phones no matter in real store 
or virtual shop. Besides explaining our payment architecture 
and processes in detail, evaluation of the MPDTN’s security 
from the aspect of defender and different roles of the 
attackers is provided in the paper. The investigation shows 
that, MPDTN can not only satisfy security criteria of 
confidence, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation 
but also provide full transaction privacy to consumers. 
 




Internet has become an indispensable part of our daily life. 
Various e-commerce including auction, e-shop, 
entertainment, etc. grows fast. More and more services can 
be provided via Internet. At the meanwhile, payment is 
becoming an important issue of the research about E-
commerce.  
On the other hand, mobile phones become more and 
more popular with the developing of mobile devices and 
telecommunication technologies. For example, each person 
has at least one mobile phone in Taiwan [1]. Besides, 
Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) and Wireless Markup 
Language (WML) makes the dream of surfing the internet 
through mobile devices come true [2]-[6]. Many commercial 
applications and services are developed and integrated into 
cell phones. The convenience of cell phone makes it possible 
to transact without restriction of time and place. The feature 
seems to explore the door of mobile commerce and attract 
consumer’s eyes. The convenient and secure payment tool 
will play an important role during the evolution of m-
commerce 
Furthermore, the traditional plastic and electronic 
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currencies, such as credit card, smart card, or e-cash, have 
critical shortcomings that we have to overcome. Hackers or 
attackers can easily pretend to be the legal users and 
consume at will if they get the credit card numbers and the 
expiration date. The existing hole of security causes great 
losses to merchants, consumers, and banks. Most of 
important, the untrustworthy feeling restrains the 
development of novel payment tools and e-commerce.  
In order to promote the m-commerce and improve 
existing payment schemes, the securer and more convenient 
payment tools are needed urgently. Due to the highly 
popular mobile phones and the well-developed 
telecommunication technology, payment via handsets is 
becoming a visual trend other than a dream. More and more 
investigations focus on the important issue. People expect 
that handset can do anything - no wallet and no cards. 
A mobile payment scheme by using mobile phone is 
proposed in the paper. Mobile phones are the main payment 
media for transactions in the scheme. To reduce the risk of 
security and provide the user with higher privacy, the 
scheme called MPDTN provides the idea of “Mobile 
Payment with Dynamic Transaction Number”. The second 
section introduces some of the existing mobile payment 
mechanisms. The third part goes into detail about MPDTN 
mechanism and its architecture. Evaluation of MPDTN’s 
security from different points of view is investigated in 
section four. Finally, conclusions and possible future 
research are provided. 
 
II.  Related Works 
 
Before introducing our model, we first review some existing 
mobile payment mechanisms and discuss their advantages 
and disadvantages. 
Considering the transaction cost and the convenience, 
some mobile payment mechanisms using credit card 
numbers were proposed. Li used consumer’s personal cell 
phone number as the transaction code instead of credit card 
number [7]. The author claimed that cell phones should take 
the place of credit cards when making transaction because of 
the convenience and the security of cell phone.   
Step1: Li’s payment process can be depicted as Fig.1. It 
includes the functions which the participators 
performed and the information transferred between 
participators. The process of Fig. 1 is illustrated as 
follows: 




– cell phone number
sign( )
encrypt( )
– personal private key
summary( )















– customers’ public key






Fig. 1 Process of mobile credit payment 
 
Step2: The consumer can buy products in the real store or 
the web store, and gives the seller his cell phone 
number. The merchant summarizes the transaction-
related information, such as the product’s ID, the 
transaction date and the customer’s cell phone 
number. This activity is represented by the notation 
“summary( )”. Then, through wired network, he 
submits these data to the USSD (Unstructured 
Supplementary Service Data) sever of 
telecommunication service provider.    
Step3: The operator then makes an USSD connection with 
the consumer through the phone number, and 
confirms the transaction information with the 
consumer after authentication. 
Step4: After the consumer confirms the transaction 
information, he will use his personal private key 
which is stored in the SIM card of the mobile phone 
to sign the transaction data, and transfer the data back 
to the operator. 
Step5: The operator delivers the signed transaction data to 
the cooperative bank. 
Step6: The bank uses the consumer’s public key to verify the 
consumer’s identity and then checks his credit line. 
The bank also verifies the certificate of the merchant 
at the same time. After the verification, the bank 
deals with the transaction and transfers the receipt to 
the merchant. 
Step7: The consumers get the result of the transaction from 
the merchant. 
The advantage of the payment mechanism mentioned 
above is that we can reduce the consumers’ risk even if the 
phone number is eavesdropped. Usually, it is very risky that 
consumers provide the credit card number and expiration 
date when paying with credit card. Besides, the usage of the 
digital signature in the SIM card can prevent the consumer 
identity from being forged.  
Nowadays, transaction privacy that consumer desired is 
more and more emphasized. We cannot guarantee the 
privacy when making transactions by a consumer’s phone 
number. Merchants may gather the consumer’s consuming 
habits or promote their new products by sending messages if 
they know the phone numbers of the customers. This will 
bother the consumers to certain extent. Hence, how the 
payment mechanism provides the transaction privacy cannot 
be ignored.   
Su designed and implemented a mobile payment system 
with high flexibility [8]. His proposal for mobile payment is 
similar to the mechanism mentioned before. When the 
customer transacts, he transferred a fixed “User 
Identification” to merchant instead of phone number. The 
merchant summarizes the transaction data and submits it to 
the operator. Then the operator confirms the transaction to 
the consumer through the phone number of the 
corresponding user identification.  
Although consumers own their purchasing privacy to 
some degree by using the “User Identification”, the operator 
still control the private transaction information. Moreover, 
because the “User Identification” is fixed, the merchants still 
can collect the consuming habits of certain customer. 
Therefore, we propose a mobile payment mechanism which 
not only satisfies the conditions of security, such as 
confidence, integrity, and non-repudiation, but also provide 
full transaction privacy by making use of dynamic 
transaction number. Rubin and Wright proposed a scheme in 
which a dynamic and limited-lifetime credit card number 
through symmetric encryption is used [9]. Since the credit 
card number can just be used a few times, it reduces the 
security risk. Considering the characteristics of our payment 
scenario, we adopt the asymmetric encryption protocol to 
produce a dynamic transaction number, and we believe that 
it can provide the consumer with the complete privacy 
during the whole transaction process. 
 
III.   Mpdtn Mechanism 
 
The mobile payment mechanism we proposed uses the” 
dynamic transaction number” to ensure the confidence and 
privacy. The participators in the transaction process include 
the merchants, operators, and banks. We have two 
assumptions in the mechanism:  
 The operator is trustworthy and will not disclose the 
sensitive information of the consumers.  
 The communication network between participators is 
kept connective. 
In the following, we will illustrate the payment 
mechanism in detail: the architecture of the payment 
mechanism is described in section one; the interactions 
between participants are illustrated in section two.  
  
A. Architecture of payment system 
 
The participators in our payment system include: 
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consumers, merchants, the operator, and banks.  




PhoneNo  The consumer’s phone number  
BKR  The bank’s private key 
BKU  The bank’s public key  
OKR  The operator’s private key 
OKU  The operator’s public key  
PasswdTrans  
The transaction password 
which is only known by the 
consumer and the operator.  
PasswdAcct 
The account password which 
is only known by the consumer 
and the bank. 
RandNo  A random number.  
TransNo  
The transaction number only 
created legally by the consumer. 
Price The total price of the goods. 
SerialNo  A serial number generated by the merchant.  
Date-Time  The date and time of the transaction.  
TransData  The transaction data summarized by the merchant.  
Digest 
The message digest created 
by one way hash function. The 
inputs of the hash function are 
TransData and PasswdAcct . 
TransRe  The transaction receipt.  
AccountC 
The financial account of the 
consumer. 
AccountM 
The financial account of the 
merchant. 
CertificateM 
The certificate of the 
merchant.  
IDO The identity of the operator. 
Record  The record of transferring accounts.  
PaymentRe  The payment receipt.  
 
 Consumer: The consumers can purchase the 
merchandise with cell phone at a store or website. The 
operator’s public key is stored in the SIM card and used 
to generate the transaction numbers. The consumers can 
pay for the purchasing by using the transaction number.  
 Merchant: The merchants provide goods to 
consumers. They might be real store or the web store. In 
the process of transaction, the merchants are responsible 
for summarizing and transferring the transaction data to 
the operator.  
 Operator: The telecommunication operator plays 
an important role in the payment system. After receiving 
the transaction data from the merchants, the operator has 
to confirm this transaction with the consumer using 
USSD (Unstructured supplementary service data) 
messages. The operator has asymmetric keys for data 
encryption, includes the public keys of all cooperative 
bank. In the proposed payment mechanism, the operator 
is assumed to be trustworthy. The operator has to check 
whether if the consumer is a legal subscriber of the 
payment service. 
 Bank: The bank is responsible for settlement of 
accounts and the verification of consumers and 
merchants. After the settlement, the bank will transfer the 
receipts to consumer and merchant.  
The detail of our payment mechanism is illustrated in 
next paragraphs, and the abbreviations of the relevant data 
used in the payment system are shown in Table 1. 
 
B. Interactions between the participators 
 
After the introduction of the participators, we now 
describe the interactions between the participants of the 
payment mechanism. There are three phases in our payment 
scheme: initiation phase, transaction phase, and settlement 
phase. We demonstrate each phase from the views of the 
participators.  
 
 1) Initiation phase. This phase includes the 
requirements and the preparations of each participant before 
the payment mechanism performs. Following, we will 
illustrate the initiation phase from aspects of each participant. 
 Consumer: First, the consumer should have the 
mobile device, such as cell phone or PDA which the 
telecommunication module is embedded in. The mobile 
device must have the capability of data storage and 
cryptographic computing. In addition, the mobile device 
can also adopt the technology of short-distance wireless 
transmission to facilitate the procedure of mobile 
payment. The consumer needs to apply for the mobile 
payment service and transfer his financial account 
(AcctC) to the operator. Then, the operator issues a 
personal transaction password (PasswdTrans) and the 
public key of the operator (OKU) to the consumer and 
stores these sensitive data in the SIM card of the cell 
phone.  
In order to reduce the waiting time of payment, the 
consumer could generate the transaction number (TransNo) 
in advance before going shopping. The transaction number is 
generated by using the operator’s public key to encrypt the 
consumer’s phone number (PhoneNo), transaction password, 
and a random number (RandNo). The random number is 
generated by the cell phone and used to make the transaction 
number dynamic. After the generation of the transaction 
number, the customer can start to use the mobile payment 
service.  
 Merchant: What ever real or virtual store the 
merchant is, it must have the capability of summarize the 
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transaction information. The merchant can communicate 
with the operator or the bank through the Internet. The 
real store needs a printer to print out the transaction 
receipt (TransRe). The web store can show the 
transaction receipt on the browser for the consumer to 
print it out. Besides, the real store can also facilitate the 
mobile payment by adopting the short-distance wireless 
transmission device.  
For the security concern, the merchant need to apply 
for a digital certificate and download the certificate of the 
operator issued by the trusted certificate authority (CA). In 
the payment process, the merchant uses the public key of the 























Fig. 2 Transaction phase of the consumer 
 
 Operator: As for the operator, they have to 
maintain additional data in the database, such as the 
transaction passwords and the identities of the 
consumers’ banks. After the customer applies for the 
mobile payment service, the operator will store the 
consumer’s sensitive data in the secure database. The 
relation between the sensitive data and the corresponding 
consumer’s phone number are protected by the operator. 
The operator also applies for its digital certificate and 
downloads all cooperative banks’ certificates from CA. 
 Bank: The bank also has to store additional data 
in the database, such as the account password 
(PasswdAcct) of the consumer which is different from the 
password of the cash card. Besides, the bank needs to 
maintain the transaction record for future inquiries. The 
same with the operator, the bank need to apply for its 
certificate, too. 
 
2) Transaction phase. This phase describes the data 
transmission and processing of all participators during the 
payment process. We focus on the consumer, the merchant, 
and the operator. 
 Consumer: To make the payment, the consumer 
transfers the transaction number and the identity of the 
operator (IDO) to the merchant. The transaction number 
is a ciphertext encrypted by using the public key of the 
operator. As mentioned in the initiation phase, several 
transaction numbers could be generated before the 
consumer goes shopping. After the merchant summarizes 
the transaction information, the consumer receives a 
transaction receipt as an evidence of this transaction 
from the merchant. The transaction receipt includes all 
transaction details, such as the product name, unit price 
of the product, and so on. 
Then, the consumer has to wait for the USSD message 
from the operator to confirm the transaction. If the 
transaction information is correct, the consumer has to input 
the account password (PasswdAcct) as a confirmation of his 
identification. The cell phone will hash the transaction data 
and the account password by a hash function while the 
account password is valid. After the hash function being 
performed, it will create a message digest (Digest). Finally, 
the consumer transmits the message digest back to the 
























































Fig. 4 Transaction phase of the operator 
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 Merchant: The merchant summarizes the required 
information into the transaction data (TransData), and 
encrypts the transaction data by using the operator’s 
public key. Then, the merchant prints out the transaction 
receipt to the consumer as a verification of this 
transaction. All details about this transaction such as the 
item name and unit price are included in this receipt. The 
merchant transmits the transaction data to the operator 
according to the IDO of the consumer for further 
confirmation. As shown in Fig. 3, the transaction data 
transferred includes the relative information except the 
details of the goods in order to ensure the transaction 
privacy of the consumer.  
 Operator: The operator takes charge of the 
verification of the consumer and the transaction. After 
the operator receives the transaction data from the 
merchant, it decrypts the transaction data with its private 
key (OKR) to get the transaction number. The operator 
further decrypts the transaction number and verifies the 
consumer’s transaction password. If no error occurs in 
the verification, the operator will transfer the transaction 
data to the consumer through USSD connection for 
further check and waits for the consumer’s response as 












[TransData || Digest || AccountC] BKU
 
 
Fig. 5 Transaction phase of the operator (cont.) 
 
Then, the operator will receive the message digest from 
the consumer if the transaction data is correct. The operator 
encrypts the transaction data, the message digest, and the 
consumer’s bank account (AccountC) with the bank’s public 
key (BKU) and transfers these data to the cooperative bank 
for account settlement as shown in Fig 5.  
 
3) Settlement phase. The settlement phase describes the 
verification and account settlement performed by the bank. 
When the bank receives the encrypted data from the operator, 
it uses its private key (BKR) to decrypt the ciphertext. The 
bank can find the account password of the consumer by the 
corresponding financial account. Then the bank calculates 
the hash function over the concatenation of the transaction 
data and the account password of the consumer. If the 
comparison between the output of the hash function and the 
message digest from the operator is the same, the bank will 
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Fig. 6 Settlement phase of the bank 
 
After settling account, the bank sums up the transaction 
and transfer the payment receipt to the merchant. The bank 
also needs to transmit the transaction record to the operator 
for avoiding the possible dispute. Then the merchant prints 
the payment receipt to the consumer, as shown in Fig. 6. 
Every transaction has to go through the transaction phase 
and settlement phase. 
 
C. Overview of the payment process 
 
In this section, we go into detail about the payment 
process of our scheme. Some notation should be explained at 
first. X → Y : Z denotes that a sender X sends a message or 
data Z to the receiver Y, h( ) denotes a one way hash 
function, M || N denotes a concatenation of data M and N, 
and [ I ] J denotes a message I encrypted by key J. In our 
payment scheme, the payment process includes seven steps. 
The transaction steps are as follows:  
Step 1) Consumer → Merchant : TransNo, IDO 
Step 2) Merchant → Consumer : TransRe 
         Merchant → Operator : [TransData] OKU  
Step 3) Operator → Consumer : TransData 
Step 4) Consumer → Operator : Digest 
Step 5) Operator → Bank :  
         [TransData || Digest || AccountC] BKU 
Step 6) Bank → Merchant : PaymentRe 
         Bank → Operator : Record 
Step 7) Merchant → Consumer : PaymentRe 
In step 1, when the consumer shops at a real store or a 
web store, he has to transfer the TransNo to the merchant. 
The TtransNo is generated as follows: 
 
TransNo = [PhoneNo || PasswdTrans || RandNo] OKU   
(1) 
 
The consumer can generate several transaction numbers 
and store them in the cell phone to facilitate the payment. 
In step 2, after merchant received the TransNo, it 
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summarizes the transaction information into TransData. 
 
TransData = TransNo || Date-Time || SerialNo || 
AccountM      || Price || CertificateM              (2) 
 
Then, the merchant prints out the transaction receipt to 
the consumer. The merchant also encrypts the TransData 
with OKU and transmits it to the operator according to the 
IDO received from consumer. 
In step 3, the operator decrypts the data received from 
the merchant and gets the TransNo. The operator further 
decrypts the TransNo and gets the PasswdTrans of the 
consumer. The operator will check if the transaction 
password is correct. If the PasswdTrans is valid, the operator 
will transmit the TransData to the consumer through USSD 
connection. 
 














Fig. 7 Data flow of transaction procedure 
 
In step 4, the consumer checks the TransData received 
from the operator. If this transaction is confirmed, the 
consumer is asked to enter the PasswdAcct for a hash 
function: 
 
Digest = h (TransData || PasswdAcct)          (3) 
 
The cell phone will create a message digest and send it 
back to the operator. But if the consumer rejects the payment 
or enters the wrong PasswdAcct three times, the operator will 
transfer a message to inform the merchant about the breach 
of the transaction.  
In step 5, the operator summarizes the relative 
transaction information and encrypts them with the BKU. 
The operator transmits the encrypted data to the bank 
through wired network. 
In step 6, the bank decrypts the data received from the 
operator with its BKR. The bank will find the corresponding 
PasswdAcct of the consumer according to the AccountC and 
check if the PasswdAcct is valid. Then, the bank calculates the 
same hash function and compares it with the Digest as 
follows: 
 
Check if  h (TransData || PasswdAcct) = Digest     (4) 
 
If the result of the hash function is the same with Digest, 
the bank will settle accounts and transmit the payment 
receipt to the merchant. At the same time, the bank also 
transmits the transferring record to the operator and sends 
the short message to notify the consumer. In step 7, the 
merchant prints out the payment receipt to the consumer. 
The web store can show the payment receipt on the web 
browser, and the consumer can print it by himself.   
Above, the payment mechanism has been demonstrated 
in detail. All data transferred between the participants are 
shown in Fig. 7. According to the security criteria, we 
evaluate our payment mechanism from different points of 
view in section four. 
 
IV.   Analysis of Security and Discussion 
 
When we talk about security and related subject, some 
security requirements should be achieved, as mentioned in 
[10]-[13]. In this section, we evaluate our payment 
mechanism from two aspects: the aspect of the security 
criteria and the aspect of the attacker’s role. 
 
A. Evaluate from the aspect of security criteria 
 
1) Confidentiality. We first consider the aspect of data 
storage; the sensitive data of transaction and the encryption 
keys are stored in the SIM card which is a tamper-resist 
device. And if the cell phone was lost or stolen by others, the 
verification of the PIN and the PasswdAcct prevent the cell 
phone from misusing by someone else. It is proven that even 
the SIM of legal user is cloned, the fraudulent usage can be 
detected quickly [14].  
As for data transmission, the data between the merchant 
and the operator or between the operator and the bank can be 
transferred through the wired network such as ADSL, which 
use SSL transaction protocol to ensure the security of data. 
SSL is also a practical solution for ensuring end-to-end 
security of wireless Internet transactions even within today’s 
technological constraints [15]. In our payment scheme, the 
data transferred in the wired network is protected by the 
public-key based algorithm which can prevent the 
confidential attack effectively [16]. For example, the RSA 
public-key encryption algorithm is used for the protection 
between the bank and the operator, and illustrated as 
follows:  
The Operator has the public key of the bank: BKU = {e, 
n} and the bank has the corresponding private key: BKR = {d, 
n} (n is calculated from p*q, p and q are both prime, e is a 
selected integer and the greatest common divisor of e and (p-
1)(q-1) is 1, d is calculated from d= e-1mod((p-1)(q-1)) ). Let 
M be the plaintext and C be the cipertext. The operator 
encrypts the secret transaction information with BKU : 
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Operator :  C = Me (mod n), M<n                (5) 
 
Only one that has corresponding private key can decrypt 
the ciphertext and gets the secret information (i.e. in the 
example above, only legal bank that has the privet key BKR 
can decrypt the ciphertext). 
 
Bank :  M = Cd (mod n) = Med (mod n)           (6) 
 
It is infeasible to determine d given e and n. Currently, a 
1024-bit key size is considered strong enough for virtually 
all applications. Besides, the secure connection of USSD 
between the operator and the consumer is provided by the 
signal protection mechanisms of GSM/UMTS [17].  
 
Table 2. Key sizes for equivalent security levels (bits). 
 
Symmetric ECC RSA/DH/DSA 
80 163 1024 
128 283 3072 
192 409 7680 
256 571 15,360 
  
2) Privacy. The transaction privacy of the consumer 
depends on the TransNo — it is very difficult for the 
merchant to get personal information of the consumer 
because it has no corresponding key to decrypt the TransNo. 
The TransNo is protected by the encryption of the 
asymmetric cryptography which is hard to be broken [18]. 
Some cryptographic algorithms which are suitable for the 
wireless communication were proposed, such as Elliptic 
Curve cryptography (ECC) [19]. A 571-bit ECC is currently 
equivalent in security to 15,360-bit RSA, as shown in Table 
2. The smaller key size for equivalent security levels 
accounts for the performance advantages to be obtained 
from substituting ECC for RSA, especially in wireless 
environment. The Elliptic Curve cryptography is derived 
from the equation of elliptic curve:   
 
y2 = x3 + ax + b                     (7) 
 
where a and b are elements of a finite field with pn elements, 
p is a prime greater than 3. The detail about Elliptic Curve 
cryptography can be found in the reference [20].  
Under the proposed mechanism, the merchant is unable 
to collect the purchasing habits of a consumer because of the 
secure protections of the asymmetric cryptography suitable 
for small hardware, such as ECC.  
In the aspect of the operator and bank, only total amount of 
the price is in the transaction data. So, even though the 
operator and the bank knew well about the real identity of 
the consumers, they cannot know what merchandise the 
consumer has purchased (as shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 6). In 




















Fig. 8 Authentication using a one-way hash function 
 
3) Authentication. The consumer is authenticated three 
times in our payment mechanism: 
 First, the cell phone verifies the PIN of the consumer. 
 Second, the operator verifies the PasswdTrans after 
decrypting the TransNo. 
 Third, the bank verifies the PasswdAcct of the consumer 
through message authentication using a one-way hash 
function depicted in Fig. 8. 
With those tree authentications, the risk of counterfeit is 
reduced to the minimum.  
As for the merchant, the bank authenticates the merchant 
by verifying its certificate. The certificate of the merchant is 
issued from the trusted third party which could be the 
governmental institution, so it can retrain the malicious 
merchant. Sulin proposed a new design of trusted third party 
which is built on the current models of CAs but has enriched 
functionality [21]. They proposed a Trusted Third Party 
System Strategy (TTPSS). TTPSS is a sequential 
equilibrium strategy of the trusted third party system stage 
game. The TTP model can be very effective in promoting 
small business online transactions and consumer-to-
consumer transactions. This authentication model could also 
be adopted in our payment scheme to expend the 
participators and to ensure the transaction effectiveness. 
 
4) Non-repudiation. After the consumer confirms the 
transaction, he has to enter the PasswdAcct for the calculation 
of message digest. Then, the bank authenticates the 
consumer by verifying the message digest. Only the legal 
consumer and the bank can calculate the same Digest 
because the PasswdAcct is only known by them. The 
transaction is confirmed if the Digest was correctly verified, 
and the consumer cannot deny the transaction. The bank 
transmits the payment receipt to merchant after account 
settlement, so the merchant can avoid the risk of consumer’s 
bad debit. 
 
5) Integrity. After the merchant summarizes the TransData, 
it prints out the TransRe to the consumer. The bank transfers 
a PaymentRe to the merchant after the account settlement (as 
shown in Fig. 2). Then the merchant print the PaymentRe to 
the consumer. These two receipts can be combined through 
the SerialNo of the transaction. The consumer can ensure the 
integrity of the transaction by comparing these two receipts. 
 
6) Other Discussion. Besides the security criteria mentioned 
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above, our payment mechanism is also feasible. The main 
reason is that it will not take great cost to the participator to 
adopt the payment mechanism into his business model. 
The consumer can generate the TransNo before go shopping. 
And the computational load can be reduced in the payment 
process because only hash function is performed by the cell 
phone. 
 
B. Evaluation from the aspect of attacker’s role 
 
There are four participators in our payment scheme and any 
of them might be malicious except the operator. The 
operator is assumed to be trustworthy in our mechanism. We 
will discuss the possible attacks of the malicious 
participators and how to prevent them in our payment 
scheme in this section.   
 
1) Malicious merchant─deny the transaction. In our 
payment scheme, the merchant need to deliver the goods to 
the consumer after receiving the PaymentRe. The malicious 
merchant might refuse to deliver the goods and conceal the 
PaymentRe from the bank. But while the bank completes the 
account settlement, it will not only transfer the PaymentRe 
to the merchant but also send the consumer a short message 
which is used to notify the consumer of the completion of 
the payment. The bank also needs to transmit the transaction 
record to the operator for future inquiry. Therefore, after the 
consumer received the short message, the truth of the 
payment can be proved. The consumer can demonstrate the 
evidence of the payment from the transaction record 
preserved in the operator and bank.       
 
2) Malicious merchant─steal the TransNo from the 
consumer. The malicious merchant might try to get the legal 
TransNo of the consumer by hook or by crook. If the 
merchant uses the TransNo which is stolen from the 
consumer to forge a transaction, the consumer will be aware 
of the misuse of the TransNo. In the step 3 of our payment 
process, when the operator confirms the transaction with the 
consumer through USSD connection, the consumer can 
refuse the transaction. Moreover, once the consumer found 
the misappropriation of the TransNo, he (she) can inform the 
operator to trace the malicious merchant through the digital 
certificate of the merchant.  
       
3) Malicious consumer─fabricate the TransNo. The 
malicious consumer might try to forge the TransNo of 
another legal consumer to make transaction. They might 
create a TransNo by getting wise to another consumer’s 
PhoneNo. But the fake TransNo will soon be revealed 
because the malicious consumer cannot get the exact 
PasswdTrans of the corresponding PhoneNo. Even if the 
malicious consumer is lucky enough to guess the right 
PasswdTrans, he will not pass the transaction confirmation in 
the step 3 and the verification of PasswdAcct in the step 4 of 
our payment scheme. The probability of guessing right the 
PasswdTrans and the PasswdAcct at the same time is very little.      
 
4) Malicious bank─disclose the PasswdAcct. Generally, the 
bank is trusty. However, the employee of the bank might 
benefit from disclosing the important consumer information. 
For example, the employee might eavesdrop to the 
PasswdAcct of the consumer and sell it to the evildoer. But 
our payment mechanism is secure enough to against the 
attack which the PasswdAcct is misused. As for the consumer, 
the exact PasswdTrans and PasswdAcct are needed in every 
transaction. The transaction can not be complete without one 
of these two passwords. Besides, the transaction 
confirmation by the operator can prevent the transaction 
relative passwords are misused by malicious consumer. As 
for the merchant, it delivers the good to the consumer only 
when the PaymentRe is received and no cancel message is 
received from the operator. The consumer authentication and 
the transaction confirmation executed by the operator can 
prevent the consumer and the merchant from losing on 
illegal transaction. 
      
5) Malicious merchant and bank─tamper the TransData. 
The malicious merchant might collude with the employee of 
the bank, and devise a way to tamper the TransData to make 
profit illegally. For example, the employee of the bank might 
tamper the Price of the transaction in our payment process. 
Because the bank knows the PasswdAcct of the consumer, it 
can forge the original Digest and confirm the transaction. 
The malicious merchant might use the fake PaymentRe to 
take the place of the real one. But while the bank transfers 
the fake price into the account of malicious merchant, the 
Record transmitted to the operator in the step 6 of the 
payment process will reveal the illegal activity. The Record 
is generated through the secure mechanism of the bank, and 
it is not easy to be tampered.  
     
6) Malicious consumer and bank─forge the PaymentRe. 
The malicious consumer may cooperate with the employee 
of the bank. The malicious consumer might pretend to 
purchase goods in the merchant and refuse to pay for the 
transaction actually. Then, the employee of the bank may try 
to forge a PaymentRe according to the confirmation data 
transmitted from the operator to the consumer. But in our 
payment mechanism, if the legal consumer rejects the 
payment, the operator will notify the merchant that the 
payment is cancelled by the consumer. So, even if the 
merchant received the fake PaymentRe, it will have the 
sufficient reason to deny the transaction.   
After the discussion and evaluation, our payment 
mechanism can ensure high security for all participators. 
 
7) Malicious consumer and merchant─ repudiate the 
transaction. The malicious consumer might collaborate 
with malicious merchant to make the transaction 
inconsistent, and request for the compensation to the bank. 
But the bank proceeds to transfer account only after the 
identifications of the consumer and the merchant are 
504                                                                                                                     KUEN-LIANG SUE, CHUNG-HSIEN TSAI 
authenticated and the transaction is confirmed by the legal 
consumer. Therefore, the merchant and the consumer cannot 
deny the transaction and have no reason to ask the bank for 
compensation. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
The development of the Internet, handset devices, and 
telecommunication technologies are changing the way of our 
life extremely, especially in commerce. Lots of novel 
business models emerge rapidly. However, the most 
important and insecure stage in the transaction is payment. 
Without an appropriate payment mechanism, any business 
model will be hardly put into practice. Therefore, we have 
an urgent need for designing a securer and more convenient 
payment mechanism. 
The payment mechanism we proposed adopts the cell 
phone to be the payment tool. By making use of the 
transaction number, our payment mechanism provides many 
advantages: 
 Security: Our payment scheme meets security criteria 
which includes confidentiality, authentication, integrity, 
and non-repudiation during the payment process. Besides, 
the risk can be minimized when the consumer loses the 
cell phone or the cell phone is forged because our 
method provides multiple authentications.  
 Full transaction privacy: The merchant cannot get the 
real identification of the consumer because the 
transaction number is dynamically changed and 
protected by the asymmetric encryption. Besides, the 
operator and the bank cannot acquire the detail of the 
merchandise purchased by the consumer except the total 
amount of price. Therefore, no one except the consumer 
can gather the transaction habit. 
 Convenience: The time of the payment can be shortened 
because the time-consuming operation of the encrypt 
algorithm can be done in the initiation phase. In other 
words, the transaction number can be generated and 
stored in the cell phone before the consumer goes 
shopping.  
 Low computational load of the mobile phone: The 
operation of the consumer in the transaction phase can be 
only a one-way hash function. The speed of one-way 
hash function is approximately 100 times faster than that 
of the encryption/decryption of the secret-key system and 
the speed of the encryption/decryption of the secret-key 
system is about 100 times faster than that of the 
signature/verification of the public key system [13].     
 Feasibility: In addition, the participators can adopt our 
payment scheme into their business model without 
additional cost of hardware. And it is implemented based 
on the existing network environment. 
Besides the advantages mentioned above, we also 
evaluate the payment scheme from the aspect of security 
criteria and the attacker’s role in detail. Our payment scheme 
has been proved that it can effectively prevent any 
participator’s malicious attack.  
Our payment mechanism is very suitable for the payment 
from medium to large amounts of money because it has 
overall protection of security and full transaction privacy. 
And it can be more flexible if we integrate it with other 
payment systems, such as micro-payment system, e-cash and 
so on. Our mobile payment scheme has made great progress 
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